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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to apply recently proposed individual welfare measures
in the context of random utility models of labour supply. Contrary to the standard
practice of using reference preferences and wages, these measures preserve preference
heterogeneity in the normative step of the analysis. They also make the ethical
priors, implicit in any interpersonal comparison, more explicit.
On the basis of microdata from the Socio Economic Panel (SOEP) for married
couples in Germany, we provide empirical evidence about the sensitivity of the wel-
fare orderings to different normative principles embodied in these measures. We
retrieve individual and household specific preference heterogeneity, by estimating a
structural discrete choice labor supply model. We use this preference information
to construct welfare orderings of households according to the different metrics, each
embodying different ethical choices concerning the preference heterogeneity in the
consumption-leisure space. We then discuss how sensitive the assessment of a hy-
pothetical tax reform is to the choice of metric. The chosen tax reform is similar to
a subsidy of social security contributions.
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1 Introduction
The last fifteen years, substantial progress has been made in modelling individual labour
supply. Random utility models based on the structural specification of preferences have
become standard. Their feasibility to account for complicated real world budget con-
straints, and their ease of interpretation make them especially attractive for the ex ante
evaluation of policy reforms in the tax benefit sphere. For an overview, see Creedy
and Kalb (2005). However, it is somewhat surprising that this proliferation has not
been matched by comparable progress or interest as far as the normative interpretation
and/or use of the positive results of these models is concerned.
Of course, the normative analysis stricto sensu, exemplified by e.g. the optimal tax
literature, has taken the progress in labour supply modelling on board (see among others
Saez 2001 and 2002; Choné and Laroque 2005, 2009, Aaberge and Colombino 2008 and
Blundell and Shephard 2009). In applied work however, many users of the models
either completely eschew normative interpretations, or report conventional measures of
’welfare’ which are not necessarily consistent with the underlying model. Indeed, many
applied papers report only aggregate labour supply changes or, when unable to avoid
distributional analysis, present changes in labour supply and/or changes in disposable
income for deciles of the gross wage distribution. There is, of course, nothing wrong
in neglecting leisure and focussing on disposable income (or consumption) alone when
constructing an individual welfare measure.1 The impression prevails however, that the
predominant use of disposable income as a welfare measure in applied work, is more
inspired by relative neglect than based on a conscious and deliberate conceptual and
normative choice. The aim of this paper is to provide empirical evidence that the choice
of the normative framework within which policy reforms, affecting the labour-leisure
choice, are evaluated, strongly affects the welfare analysis of the reform.
Of course, many papers do recognise the need to account for leisure in the normative
step of the analysis. In classical applied welfare analysis, individual welfare metrics
such as equivalent or compensating variations, are known well enough.2 In a context
of individuals with heterogeneous preferences however, both the interpretation of these
welfare metrics, and certainly their aggregation quickly faces serious difficulties. A
1Referring to income based poverty measures as alternative social welfare objectives to the standard
utilitarian ones in optimal tax theory, Creedy and Hérault (2009, p.3) call the use of disposable income,
be it as an input to a poverty measure, a non welfarist approach:
"But ‘non-welfarist’ forms are sometimes used. For example, social welfare may be based solely on
an income-based measure of poverty, which can give quite different results. Non-welfarist objectives may
go further than simply attaching no value to leisure, in that they may prefer to encourage labour supply
(whereas in a welfarist approach the existence of non-workers is acceptable in an optimal structure)."
2 In this paper we only deal with welfare metrics at the individual or household level. But the
’rebirth’ of money metrics is also prominent in aggregate analyses such as ranking countries by means
of alternatives to GDP (see Fleurbaey and Gaulier 2007 or Jones and Klenow 2010 and for an overview
Fleurbaey 2009).
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criterion derived from a simple aggregation of equivalent or compensating variations has
been shown to be neither a sufficient, nor a necessary condition to identify potential
Pareto improvements, let alone social improvements according to a well defined social
welfare function (see Boadway and Bruce, 1984 Chapter 9 or Auerbach, 1985). And in
any case, the use and aggregation of this kind of welfare metrics implicitly introduces
comparability assumptions which would preferably have been made on an explicit basis.
To deal with these problems, one can identify two tracks in the relevant literature.
The first one simply neglects the comparability and aggregation issues of the classical
individual welfare metrics in a context of preference heterogeneity. This is done e.g. by
simply sticking to the simple aggregation of compensating variations, and recognizing
the problem in an apologizing footnote (Eissa, Kleven and Kreiner, 2008 p.804, footnote
5). This seems to us quite unsatisfactory if one wants to take preference heterogeneity
seriously.
More creditworthy is the approach of Aaberge et al. (2004) and Aaberge and Colom-
bino (2008). To simulate labour supply responses to tax reforms, they estimate pref-
erences which are heterogeneous across households. When moving from the positive
into the normative step of the analysis however, they follow King (1983) in rejecting
the interpersonally incomparable equivalent or compensating variations. They impose
comparability by evaluating chosen bundles by means of one fixed preference ordering
(the so-called reference household) at reference prices. It is true that these preferences
of the reference household are estimated on a sample of individuals or households with
heterogeneous preferences, though this does not diminish the fact that in the normative
part of the analysis preference heterogeneity itself is removed from the scene.3 The nor-
mative literature on interpersonal comparisons has therefore christened this procedure
as ’Perfectionism’. It escapes the clash between, on the one hand, forms of interpersonal
comparability (e.g. Pigou-Dalton criteria, or bundle dominance) and, on the other hand,
Paretianity, by removing preference heterogeneity and imposing preferences determined
by the social planner.
Yet, precisely the research into this clash between interpersonal comparability and
Paretianity (or respecting individual preferences) in a context of preference heterogene-
ity has proven to be fruitful to discover new and complimentary perspectives in designing
individual welfare metrics in heterogeneous environments. In a series of papers, Fleur-
baey and co-authors show how to construct a normative framework which maximally
retains preference heterogeneity, and how individual welfare metrics follow from this
analysis. In this paper we demonstrate the usefulness of these individual welfare metrics
in the context of empirically estimated heterogeneous preferences. We will also illus-
trate one of the major advantages of these individual welfare metrics, to wit that they
3Also, a sensitivity analysis does not introduce genuine preference heterogeneity into the normative
analysis. In each step of the sensitivity analysis, all individuals or households are endowed with the
same preference ordering.
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bring the normative choices, inevitably present in all interpersonal comparisons, clearer
to the surface. In this respect, our paper can be read as a complement to Preston and
Walker (1999). These authors lined up many of the measures used below, in a list of
possible individual welfare metrics taking into account both consumption and leisure.
The measures proposed and used in this paper are, therfore, not new at all. What is
novel, is that the empirical rank correlations of welfare orderings based on these differ-
ent measures, can now be interpreted as showing the sensitivity of welfare orderings to
ethical choices about how to deal with preference heterogeneity. Moreover, the empiri-
cal nature of our paper complements results from similar exercises in Hodler (2009) or
Luttens and Ooghe (2007), where the application of a proposed normative analysis in
societies with heterogeneous preferences is confined to numerical simulations in highly
stylised settings.
In order to provide this empirical evidence, we use microdata from the Socio Eco-
nomic Panel (SOEP) for married couples in Germany. We retrieve individual and house-
hold specific preference heterogeneity, by estimating a structural discrete choice labour
supply model as e.g. in Aaberge et al. (1995) or van Soest (1995). We use this pref-
erence information to construct welfare orderings of households according to different
metrics of welfare, each embodying different ethical choices concerning the preference
heterogeneity in the consumption-leisure space. We then move beyond the more descrip-
tive analysis and discuss the different welfare implication of the welfare measures when
analysing a hypothetical tax reform, similar to a subsidy of social security contributions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we briefly overview the
problem of making interpersonal comparisons when preferences differ. We show how
well-understood money metrics can help fix the dilemma between respecting preferences
and making interpersonal comparisons. We focus on the normative interpretation of
these metrics. In Section 3 we present the structural model of labour supply, calculate
the welfare metrics, compare the welfare orderings, and discuss the sensitivity of wel-
fare impact of a policy reform with respect to the choice of welfare metric. Section 4
concludes.
2 The welfare metrics and their normative interpretation
2.1 Preference heterogeneity and welfare comparisons
In the following we discuss welfare comparisons when individuals have different prefer-
ences. For the exposition of the measures, we focus on single individuals, though the
same arguments apply to the household context. Observed bundles of consumption and
leisure result from individual choices. Choice is explained by means of preferences and
constraints. We define preferences in the (c, l)-space where c stands for consumption (or
net income) and l for labour supply, and denote the fact that individual i weakly prefers
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bundle (ci, li) over bundle (c0i, l
0
i) by the ordering Ri:
(ci, li)Ri
¡
c0i, l
0
i
¢
⇔ ui(ci, li) > ui(c0i, l0i) (1)
where the right-hand of (1) shows the notation by means of the preference representa-
tion function ui(ci, li). Preference heterogeneity, revealed by the subscript i beneath R,
plays a major role in this paper. We parameterise preferences as Ri = R(zi), where
vector zi contains observable variables, partly explaining heterogeneity in preferences.
The explanatory variables, therefore, appear in the preference representation function
u(c, l; zi). In the empirical application we will find that this deterministic part of the
preferences (captured by observable vector zi) explains only part of the variation in
choices for individuals facing the same constraints. The rest of the variation is due to
’unexplained heterogeneity’. At this stage, however, we do not elaborate the norma-
tive treatment of this unobserved heterogeneity. This means that we assume that two
individuals with the same vector z do have the same preferences.
The chosen bundle (ci, li) by individual i is rationalized as a choice of his most
preferred bundle, given his choice set:
(ci, li) = argmax [u(c, l; zi) |c ≤ f (Ii, wil) , l ≤ 1] , (2)
where f(.) is a function representing the tax benefit system, transforming non labour
income Ii and labour income wil, with wi denoting the gross wage for individual i, into
net income c.
In this framework, differences in outcomes for different individuals are explained
by differences in preferences (vector zi), differences in gross wages (scalar wi), and
differences in non labour incomes (scalar Ii). We illustrate a typical configuration for
two individuals (the, by now, more or less mythical Ann and Bob), denoted by subscripts
a and b in Figure 1, where for simplicity we have assumed away the tax benefit system.
Ann has a lower preference for leisure, in that, compared to Bob, she requires less
compensation to work more hours. She also has a higher non labour income than Bob,
but a lower wage. The choices made by Ann and Bob are represented by bundles a and
b respectively. Ann works more and has a higher net income and less leisure. Bob works
less, has more leisure, but a lower net income. The question at hand is: how to compare
welfare levels of Ann and Bob? Or: how to choose the (or a) metric m(ci, li;Ri, wi, Ii)
which takes into account both preferences and constraints of individuals, and allows to
order individuals from worse to better off?
That this is not an easy task has been well known for decades. The difficulty also
formally appeared in the literature in the form of an incompatibility between two sets of
axioms (see e.g. Fleurbaey and Trannoy, 2004). On the one hand there is Paretianity,
requiring that if all individuals weakly prefer social state x over social state y, the
social ordering should also express a preference of x over y. In the following we will
refer to this intuition as ’Respecting Preferences’ or ’Non Paternalism’. On the other
5
Figure 1: The choice of Ann and Bob in the (c, l)−space with different preferences,
different unearned incomes and different wages
hand, one has the axioms which embody some form of interpersonal comparability, like
Pigou-Dalton (in multidimensional settings), or dominance of bundles. We illustrate the
incompatibility with the well-known figure 2, where we use bundle dominance for the
sake of illustration.
On the one hand, bundle dominance, used to interpersonally compare Ann and Bob
and applied to bundles a and b, allows the social planner to conclude that bundle a
for Ann is to be preferred over bundle b for Bob. Respecting the preferences of Ann,
who is indifferent between bundles a and a0, also allows one to conclude that bundle a0
for Ann is to be preferred over bundle b for Bob (Conclusion I). On the other hand,
bundle dominance applied to bundles a0 and b0, leads to a ranking by the social planner
of bundle b0 for Bob being better than bundle a0 for Ann. And since Bob is indifferent
between b0 and b, we also conclude that bundle b for Bob is to be preferred over bundle
a0 for Ann (Conclusion II). Obviously Conclusion I and II cannot be simultaneously
true, illustrating the clash between axioms which express interpersonal comparability
and those that embody respect of preference heterogeneity.
The classical way out of this problem is to put aside the requirement of respecting
the heterogeneous preferences. Indeed, it has been well known for decades - although
not always honoured in practice - that broadly used concepts from applied welfare eco-
nomics such as equivalent or compensating variations, are only well defined for a given
preference ordering, and for a given price vector. In a context of preference heterogene-
ity this means that the money metrics are calculated by inserting the chosen bundle
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Figure 2: The incompatibility between bundle dominance and Paretianity
into a reference preference ordering, using reference prices (which are the same for all
individuals). This is the approach followed by Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (2004)
and Aaberge and Colombino (2008). Normatively spoken, this boils down to impose
some kind of objective criterion of welfare, which might be called a ’perfectionist’ view
of wellbeing. The analyst (or policy maker) introduces interpersonal comparability by
fixing the welfare criterion independently from the preferences of the individuals. Oth-
erwise stated, although preferences continue to play their full role in the determination
of the chosen bundles, preference heterogeneity is de facto assumed away in the nor-
mative phase of the analysis, to wit, in the step where interpersonal comparisons are
introduced.
Yet, the incompatibility described above, suggests that there is also another possi-
bility. A recent and rapidly growing strand of the (mainly normative) literature also
explores the possibility to give priority to Paretianity and to fully respect preference
heterogeneity. The incompatibility result then inevitably points to the necessity of re-
stricting the way one introduces interpersonal comparability. Recent proposals in Fleur-
baey (2006, 2008) amount to restrict the interpersonal comparability by means of what
the author calls Subset Dominance. Interpersonally comparable individual welfare levels
are obtained by measuring individual welfare by means of nested sets, Bλ, where the set
Bλ is implicitly defined by:
u(ci, li; zi) = max [u(c, l; zi) |(c, l) ∈ Bλ ] . (3)
The chosen bundle (ci, li) on a given indifference curve is evaluated by indexing the
curves by means of these equivalent sets, where λ ≤ λ0 if and only if Bλ ⊆ Bλ0 and
the situation of individual i is better the higher λ. We illustrate this way to index
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Figure 3: Indexing the indifference curve by means of the equivalent set Bλ
indifference curves in Figure 3.
This specific way to introduce interpersonal comparability not only allows to escape
the incompatibility problem. It also brings the implicit normative intuitions, embed-
ded in any interpersonal comparison, clearer to the surface. The normative principles
embedded in the choice of the welfare metric and in the way interpersonal comparisons
are made, are expressed by means of the choice of the equivalent set Bλ, and we will
discuss them in the next section. We first introduce the three different metrics used in
our empirical application as specifications of the set Bλ in (3).
The first metric is based on a specification of the equivalent set as:
BλLF =
©
(c, l)
¯¯
c ≤ λLF l, l ≤ 1
ª
, (4)
with a corresponding welfare metric for individual i equal to mLFi = λ
LF (ci, li). The
superscript LF refers to the ’Laissez Faire’ description of this choice in Fleurbaey and
Maniquet (2006). We illustrate the metric in Figure 4.
The chosen bundles a and b lead to interpersonal comparable welfare levels mLFa and
mLFb by calculating the slope of the ray through the origin which delineates the subset
of the (c, l)-space to which the indifference curve through the chosen point is tangent.
In fact this choice of the equivalent set amounts to the real wage criterion of Pencavel
(1977), and the real wage metric W5 in the list of Preston and Walker (1999).
The second class of examples rests on equivalent sets defined by
BλREF =
©
(c, l)
¯¯
c ≤ λREF + ewl, l ≤ 1ª . (5)
In this case the indifference curves are indexed by means of equivalent sets which de-
pend on a chosen reference net wage ew and an unearned income λREF , where the
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Figure 4: The "Laissez-faire" metric
corresponding individual welfare metric is then chosen to be this unearned income:
mREFi = λ
REF (ci, li, ew). Figures (5) and (6) illustrate the welfare metric for two choices
of ew, where Figure (6) contains the special case of a reference net wage equal to zero. This
specific case of mRENTi = λ
REF (ci, li, ew = 0) is called the ’Rente criterion’ by Fleurbaey
(2006), and coincides with the intercept income of Preston and Walker (1999).4
2.2 Normative interpretation of the different metrics
As such, escaping the incompatibility between Paretianity and some form of interper-
sonal comparison, by giving priority to respecting perferences, is of course not superior
to the choice of giving up Paretianity and imposing one specific utility function. There-
fore other arguments must be found to choose for the subset dominance approach. A
convincing one is given by Fleurbaey (2008) when countering the objection that the
choice of reference prices and characteristics in the money metric utility approach is
’arbitrary’:
"if the equivalence approach depends on reference parameters, it can
avoid arbitrariness if it develops an ethical theory of the choice of the ref-
4 In this case the equivalent set comes close to an interpretation of the imposition of interpersonal
comparability in terms of reference bundles (as in Schokkaert et al. 2009). When the indifference curve
is sloping upwards at l = 0, the tangency point of the equivalent set for a net wage equal to zero,
becomes the corner solution. The Rente criterion, therefore, introduces interpersonal comparability by
comparing individuals in the counterfactual situation ’as if they do not work’, that is in terms of the
reference bundle (c, 0).
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Figure 5: The reference wage metric
(  )l hours worked
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Figure 6: The Rente criterion
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erence. Some examples in the literature on fair social orderings show that
rather natural axioms of fairness may force to adopt certain reference para-
meters". Fleurbaey (2008, p. 10).
Otherwise stated, it might be easier to think about the ethical priors in terms of
choosing these equivalent sets, than in terms of a common utility function. Fleurbaey
(2005) gives the example of the metric designed to measure welfare in the multidimen-
sional space of income and health. In that case, it seems natural (though not compelling)
that one restricts interpersonal comparisons to the subset of the space where all indi-
viduals are healthy (instead of in bad health). And Schokkaert et al. (2009) argue that
when constructing a measure of job satisfaction along the lines of subset dominance,
one can better restrict interpersonal comparability to the subset of space where all in-
dividuals have a good job instead of when they have bad jobs. Hence, also the choice
of the equivalent sets described in equations (4) and (5) should ultimately be guided
by a deliberate choice between different normative principles underlying the different
metrics. What are the implicit normative choices in the three individual metrics mLFi ,
mREFi , and m
RENT
i ?
First note that all three metrics fully respect preferences. That means that all metrics
will increase when the individual moves to a bundle on a higher indifference curve of his
own preference ordering. The difference between the metrics is to be found in the way
differences in preferences play a role in the ranking of individuals. Indeed, ’Respecting
preferences’ does not tell us anything about how to eventually weigh people with different
preferences differently. Under the Laissez Faire criterion mLF of Figure 4 e.g. we judge
two individuals as equally well off when they have the same hypothetical net wage rate,
irrespective of the choices they make. In terms of a responsibility-compensation cut,
this criterion holds people fully responsible for differences in their tastes for leisure,
and only wants to compensate them for differences in their wages. In the mLF -measure,
differences in preferences, leading to different choices, are considered not to be a sufficient
reason for redistributing, or for ranking people as worse or better off.
When choosing the Rente-criterion, on the other hand, as is shown in Fleurbaey
(2006), we offer maximal protection for people who have a larger distaste for working.
With Bob’s indifference curve cutting Ann’s one from below in Figure 6, we will al-
ways judge Bob to be worse off than Ann if they face the same constraint. From this
perspective, choosing the Rente criterion as the welfare metric implements a normative
choice of holding people with a strong aversion to work minimally responsible for these
preferences.
By moving away from the zero reference wage in the Rente criterion to the mREF -
metric with a strictly positive reference wage ew, it is easy to check graphically that,
for a given constellation of preferences (such as the ones of Ann and Bob in Figure 1)
the reference wage ew in fact defines the subsets of metrics in the mREF -set which will
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judge Ann to be better off than Bob (i.e. those metrics using a reference wage below ew)
and the ones which will judge Ann to be worse off than Bob (i.e. those metrics using
a reference wage higher than ew). Increasing the reference wage ew, therefore, is to be
interpreted as moving the redistributive concerns. If we use the reference wage metric
mREF , we implicitly use social preferences in which we build in a redistributive bias in
favour of distaste for work for all individuals with wages exceeding ew (by ranking them
lower), and against apparent laziness for all individuals with wages below ew (by ranking
them higher).
The empirical application on which we report in the next two sections, is meant to
answer the question how sensitive welfare orderings are with respect to the choice of the
metric by means of which individuals are ordered, and hence to the normative choices
made by the policy maker concerning preference heterogeneity. More precisely, we derive
welfare orderings for the different measures derived above and show how sensitive the
answer to the question "who are the poor? who are the rich?" is to the chosen metric.
We also investigate the sensitivity of a ranking of gainers and losers of a stylised tax
reform, similar to a subsidy of social security contributions which increases the incentives
to participate in the labour market.
3 Estimated preference heterogeneity
To apply the above metrics in a real world context we use German microdata from the
Socio Economic Panel (SOEP), which contains detailed information about the socio-
economic situation of households. The dataset is used as the input dataset for the
Microsimulation model STSM (Steiner et al. 2008) which describes in detail the German
tax and transfer system. For a given gross wage, STSM allows to determine net income of
the household for any chosen amount of labour supply. These detailed real world budget
constraints are combined with the observed choices of the individuals in the dataset
to estimate a static structural labour supply model. Since the structural character
of this labour supply model consists of a specification of the functional form of the
preference representation function, this technique allows us to give empirical content
to the preference heterogeneity of the previous sections. We first describe the labour
supply model and the functional specification chosen for the preferences, then we give
some information about the underlying data.
3.1 Specification of household preferences
We estimate household preferences by means of a static structural discrete choice model
of labour supply, similar to Aaberge et al. (1995) or van Soest (1995). The model
is structural, because it starts from a specification of the utility function. And it is
a discrete choice model because it reduces the choices of the individual (in this case
the number of hours worked) to a finite number of discrete alternatives. The main
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advantage of this discrete specification over the continuous framework is the possibility
to account for the non-linearities in the budget set and to cope with the endogeneity of
net-household income in a relative straightforward way.
The discrete choice model starts from an empirical counterpart of the utility function
in (2), by specifying the utility level of household i at a finite number of discrete chosen
levels of labour supply. We index the discrete points by means of the subscript j =
1, ..., J . The state specific level of utility of household i, denoted vij , at the j = 1, ..., J ,
discrete states consists of a deterministic and a stochastic part:
vij = u(cij , (1− lij); zi) + ij , (6)
where u(cij , (1− lij); zi) represents the deterministic part, and ij is a stochastic random
error term which varies independently between the individuals and the discrete points.
Preference heterogeneity is captured by vector zi. Note that we will limit the analysis
to observed preference heterogeneity (see below) and hence neglect household specific
heterogeneity which is unobserved. We assume that all unobservable effects are captured
by the stochastic term ij .
In this specific empirical application, we focus on the population of married house-
holds only. Moreover, we only consider the labour supply decision of the spouse, and
assume that labour supply of husbands is exogenously determined.5 That means that
lij in (6) stands for female labour supply in household i (with Lij = 1 − lij denoting
leisure time of the wife in household i), whereas cij refers to household net income.
The latter consists of labour income of the wife, and puts the exogeneously determined
labour income of the husband into non labour income.
Similar to Aaberge et al. (2004) we use a Box-Cox functional form to specify the
deterministic part of the utility function in (6):
u(cij , (1− lij); zi) = βc
cαcij − 1
αc
+ βL(zi)
(1− lij)αL − 1
αL
, (7)
where preference heterogeneity is introduced by means of taste-shifters in the following
form:
βL(zi) = βL0 + β
0
L1zi, (8)
and vector zi includes the age of both spouses, educational dummies, the number and
age of children and a regional dummy. Preferences are determined by the parameters βc,
βL0, β
0
L1, αc and αL. The β-parameters determine the marginal utility of consumption
and leisure, whereas the α-parameters determine the concavity of the utility function
(see the appendix).
5We choose to focus on married couples since the economic literature, e.g. Blundell and MaCurdy
(1999), has shown that behavioural labour supply responses of married women are particularly impor-
tant.
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The estimation procedure is based on the assumption that the error terms ij are
i.i.d. and follow an extreme value distribution. This gives an expression of the proba-
bility for each discrete working alternative, which results in the well known conditional
logit framework that can be estimated by maximum likelihood. We want to focus on
the calculation of the welfare metrics, and not on the most sophisticated labour supply
model, as e.g. in Aaberge et al. (2004) or Blundell and Shephard (2009). Therefore, we
make some simplifying assumptions in the estimation procedure. As already announced
above, we do not account for unobserved heterogeneity. Haan (2006) has shown that
unobserved heterogeneity does not significantly affect the labour supply elasticities when
using a similar specification with cross sectional data. Nor do we model potential re-
strictions on the labour market as in Aaberge et al. (2004) or Bargain et al. (2010). The
findings of Bargain et al. (2010) imply that demand side constraints bias elasticities in
particular for men and single women, but tend to be less severe for the labour supply
decision of married women.
3.2 Data and descriptive statistics
SOEP is a representative household survey for Germany with sufficient socioeconomic
information to derive the budget line of a household, i.e., the net household income,
and to estimate labour supply behaviour.6 For this analysis we use the data collected
in 2005, with income information about the tax year 2004. We restrict the sample to
married households with a wife aged between 20 and 60 who is not self-employed, retired
or in full-time education. Moreover we consider only households in which the husband
is working full time, i.e., more than 30 hours per week. This gives us a sample of 2076
households. For female labour supply, we define J = 5 discrete working alternatives:
non-participation, two part time alternatives, full-time work and over-time.7
To derive net household income according to the tax legislation in Germany in 2004
at each discrete alternative of working hours, we use the microsimulation model STSM
(Steiner et al. 2008). More precisely, for each discrete hours point we calculate gross
household earnings as the sum of observed earnings of the husband and the state specific
earnings of the wife. Gross earnings of the women are simply the state specific hours
multiplied by her expected market wage. For working women we take the observed
wage information as their market wage, while for the non-working we impute their
expected market wage using an estimated wage equation with selection correction.8
The information on gross earnings is the key input for the microsimulation model which
describes, in detail, all relevant transfer programmes, social security contributions and
6For a detailed description of the SOEP, see Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005).
7The median of the empirical distribution in the following intervals define the discrete points: 0, [0 -
15], [16 - 34], [35 - 40], > 40. The estimation results are robust to changes in the approximation of the
distribution of working hours.
8Estimation results for the wage equation can be obtained by the authors upon request.
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income taxation and which delivers the state specific net-household income cij . Leisure
time at each hours point is simply the time endowment T = 80 minus working time.
Table 1 shows the overall distribution of the households at the five alternatives. We
also show average working hours and average monthly net household income and the
shares by region, by education level and by the presence of children younger than 3 years
old. The data reveal the relatively low labour market attachment of married women.
About 29% of all married women are not working, another 29% works part time and less
than a quarter of all married women work regular hours or more. Since in our sample,
husbands work at least 30 hours, the income distribution between the 5 discrete states
is not very unequal. In addition, this is partly related to the joint taxation with full
splitting which leads to high marginal tax rates for the secondary earner.
Table 1: Discrete employment states
Working Net East Child
Employment Share Hours Income Germans Education younger than
in % per week per months in % in years 3 years
1 not working 29.06 0 2744 13.07 11.68 27.28
2 0 - 15 hrs 18.00 10 3107 6.33 11.49 10.29
3 16 - 34 hrs 29.01 23 3398 18.99 11.91 4.09
4 35 - 40 hrs 18.33 38 3805 38.60 12.34 2.59
5 >40 hrs 5.60 42 3943 48.31 13.35 3.38
Notes: The sample consists of 2076 married households where the husband is working at least 30 hours.
The second column gives median working hours for the intervals 0, [0 - 15], [16 - 34], [35 - 40], > 40, and
this median is used to define the discrete employment states.
The share of East German households in the population is 20%, 11% of all women are low educated,
i.e. 9 years of school or less, and 11.5% of all households have a child younger 3 years.
Source: SOEP, wave 2005 and STSM
Table 1 shows interesting differences in the distribution across the employment states
by region, education, and family composition. In our sample roughly 20 % of all house-
holds live in East Germany, but we only find 13% East Germans amongst the non-
working women, and even less among part time work. On the other hand the share of
East Germans in the subset of households where the wife is working fulltime is close
to 40%. For over time work the overrepresentation of East-Germans is even larger. By
education we find that women who work more hours tend to have more years of edu-
cation. The opposite holds for the family composition. Close to 30% of non-working
women have a child younger than three years, as apposed to only 3% of those working
full time or more hours.
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3.3 Estimation Results
Table 2 presents the estimated parameters of the Box-Cox utility function in (7).
Table 2: Estimated parameters of Box-Cox utility function
Coefficient Standard Error
Preferences for Consumption
βc 3.47 0.59
αc 0.20 0.14
Preferences for Leisure
βL0 0.64 0.27
β0L1 (taste shifter dummies)
Age of wife 1.79 0.95
Age of husband -1.02 0.86
Child younger 3 1.75 0.41
Child between 4 and 6 0.95 0.23
East Germany -0.64 0.15
Low Education 0.40 0.15
Medium Education 0.28 0.10
αL -1.82 0.33
Notes: αc and αL determine the concavity of the utility function
with respect to consumption and leisure. βc and βL determine the
marginal utility of consumption and leisure.
Source: SOEP; Number of observations: 2076
Parameters αc and αL, both smaller than 1, indicate that the utility function is
concave with respect to consumption and leisure time. For consumption, the curvature
comes close to a logarithmic functional form (which would be the case if αc = 0) and
the concavity is more pronounced for leisure. As expected, households value consump-
tion positively (βc = 3.47 being positive) and - on average - women also value leisure
time positively (βL0 = 0.64). However, we find significant preference heterogeneity by
observable characteristics. In line with previous studies we find that the taste for leisure
increases with the presence of children, in particular for children younger than 3 years.
We find positive effects of the educational dummies, where the reference category is high
education. This implies that ceteris paribus women with low and medium education have
a higher preference for leisure than women with the highest educational degree. Finally,
we find important differences between women in East and West Germany. In line with
the descriptive statistics of table 1, women in West Germany have a significantly lower
inclination to work. This different pattern in female employment behaviour has often
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been analysed and is mainly explained by the different history and socialisation of the
two parts of Germany before the reunification.
In table 3 we present the preference heterogeneity by means of the variation in the
marginal rates of substitution for different subgroups. For all households in the sample,
we calculated the slope of the indifference curve at the same bundle of 40 hours of weekly
labour supply, and a net monthly income of 2000 euros. The results are striking. On
average the MRS in this bundle is 8.5 euros, though there is large variation. According
to the estimated preferences, East German women are willing to work an additional
hour for less than half the compensation asked by West German women (3.9 compared
to 9.6). The presence of young children increases the distaste for work dramatically.
The slope of the indifference curves for lower educated people is steeper than for higher
educated ones, and contrary to what one would expect, the preference for work is not
lower, but higher for females above 55.
Table 3: Marginal rates of substitution for different groups
Marginal Rate of Substitution Standard error
Whole Sample 8.5 5.1
West German household 9.6 4.8
East German household 3.9 3.9
children younger than 3 19.8 3.7
children younger than 6 15.7 5.6
low education 11.0 4.3
medium education 9.8 4.4
high education 7.5 5.3
female younger than 25 12.2 7.8
female between 25 and 55 13.2 6.8
female older than 55 8.4 5.1
Labor Supply Elasticities of 1% increase in gross wages
Change in Participation Rate (in %) 0.16
Change in Working Hours (in %) 0.34
Notes: Marginal rates of substitution were calculated in the bundle (c, l) = (2000, 40).
Labour supply elasticities were obtained by increasing female gross wages by 1%
Source: SOEP; Number of observations: 2076
At the bottom of table 3 we also provide information about the size of the behavioural
responses with respect to changes in financial incentives by simulating labour supply
elasticities. In particular, we increase female gross wages by 1% and given the estimated
parameters, we simulate relative changes in expected average participation rates and
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the relative change in weekly working hours. The magnitude of the elasticities is very
much in line with previous studies and suggests that women only modestly respond to
changes in their budget line.
3.4 Empirical welfare metrics
To calculate the welfare metrics defined in section 2 for the preferences estimated in this
section, we took 100 random draws from the extreme value distribution of the stochastic
component. For each of the draws we determine labour supply behaviour of the female
in the household by selecting the discrete choice which gives the highest utility. For each
of the draws, we also calculate the corresponding net income and the welfare metric by
means of the analytical or numerical procedure described in the appendix. Finally, we
calculate expected labour supply, expected net income, and the expected value of the
welfare metric by averaging over the 100 draws.
4 Who are the poor? Who are the rich? Who are the
gainers? Who are the losers?
We present the sensitivity of the welfare ordering to the chosen normative framework
for individual welfare measurement in three stages. First, we compare the ordering
of households from worst to best off for each welfare metric in a stylised setting of
households who only differ in their preferences. Next, we produce an analogous picture
for our real world sample of households, where differences in preferences interact with
differences in gross wage rates and non-labour income. Finally, we also investigate the
sensitivity of a distribution of gainers and losers of a stylised tax reform for the chosen
welfare metrics.
4.1 Results for 24 stylised households
We defined a set of stylised households by fixing the female gross wage at €10 in a
household where the husband is working full time (38 hours a week) at a gross wage
of €15 per hour. With given gross female wage, and a given non labour income these
stylized households only differ in their preferences. The combination of two regional
values (E for East and W for West German), the possibility that children younger than
3 are present (K if present, N if not), three levels of education (L for low, M for medium
and H for high), and two selected ages (25 and 45) produces 24 typical households.
Figure 7 shows the results of simulating labour supply for the females in these house-
holds, and the corresponding monthly net income. All results are in expected values.
The preference heterogeneity induces large variations in labour supply behaviour, rang-
ing from about 6 hours a week, to nearly 30 hours a week. All households choose a
bundle on the budget constraint, and figure 7 clearly reveals the upward shift of the
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Figure 7: Expected labour supply and net income for 24 stylised households
budget constraint due to the presence of child allowances in the tax benefit system.
Besides the effect of young children, the figure mainly illustrates that females in East-
ern German households, in general, work more than Western German ones. The whole
North-East part of Figure 7 is made up of East German households. Only if they re-
ceived less education and are older (in this case 45 years old, see label E-N-L-45), they
reduce their labour supply.
The different choices in Figure 7 obviously lead to different net incomes for the
households. Apart from child allowances, working more also leads to a higher net income
of the household, since all households have the same gross wage and the same non labour
income. Therefore, the young East German household with no kids and high education
who works most (label E-N-H-25) is considered to be the best-off in terms of net income,
whereas the older West German household with kids and a middle education level (label
W-K-M-45) who supplies the lowest amount of labour is considered to be the worst off
in income terms. This is presented in Table 4. For different individual welfare metrics
we give the position in the welfare ordering, with "1" indicating the poorest household,
and "24" the richest one.
The sensitivity of the answer to the popular and obviously relevant policy question
"who are the poor? who are the rich?" to the normative choices underlying the different
welfare metrics, is tremendous. Household W-K-M-45 is the poorest in terms of income,
but quickly moves up the ladder of the welfare distribution when leisure is taken into
account. Moreover, its position heavily depends on how the policy maker or social
analysts weighs its preference characteristics relative to households who have preferences
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Table 4: Position in the welfare ordering of 24 stylized households
labour net Position in welfare ordering based on
Household supply income net Rente mREF with Reference Wage
Type hours/ €/ income criterion wage ew = criterion
week month mRENT €7 €12 €20 mLF
E-N-L-25 25.9 1768 22 20 24 13 8 7
W-N-L-25 15.4 1616 8 10 1 3 9 10
E-K-L-25 8.6 1616 7 4 2 10 20 16
W-K-L-25 7.8 1602 4 1 3 18 11 21
E-N-L-45 17.8 1646 13 19 20 22 2 8
W-N-L-45 16.0 1620 10 12 6 8 6 14
E-K-L-45 8.2 1610 6 3 5 16 21 17
W-K-L-45 7.0 1592 2 2 9 19 16 24
E-N-M-25 24.4 1747 21 23 21 2 12 4
W-N-M-25 17.4 1641 11 13 13 4 10 6
E-K-M-25 11.4 1657 16 9 10 11 22 13
W-K-M-25 7.8 1601 3 6 4 17 14 20
E-N-M-45 24.3 1745 20 18 17 7 3 11
W-N-M-45 15.9 1617 9 15 8 5 13 12
E-K-M-45 10.9 1649 15 11 7 14 23 15
W-K-M-45 6.8 1582 1 7 15 23 17 22
E-N-H-25 28.0 1801 24 24 22 1 4 3
W-N-H-25 18.9 1662 18 21 23 24 5 2
E-K-H-25 11.6 1662 17 8 16 9 15 23
W-K-H-25 10.7 1647 14 14 12 21 18 18
E-N-H-45 26.2 1774 23 22 14 12 1 1
W-N-H-45 19.1 1667 19 17 19 6 7 5
E-K-H-45 10.7 1645 12 16 18 15 24 9
W-K-H-45 8.1 1602 5 5 11 20 19 19
Notes: the labels of the households consists of four characteristics, West/East,
Kids/No kids, Low, Medium or High education, and age of the female in the household.
that are more favourable to supply labour. With the wage criterion e.g., which explicitly
ignores differences in net incomes resulting from differences in preferences if gross wages
are equal, the same household W-K-M-45 ends up in the third position of the welfare
distribution. The reverse holds for the household which is classified as best-off in net
income terms (E-N-H-25). With the wage criterion this richest household is considered
to be one of the worst-off (with the criterion mREF and a reference wage of €12 it
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is even the absolutely poorest household). These rerankings in the welfare ordering,
based on clearly specified individual welfare metrics for this subset of households who
only differ in their preferences, are striking. Preference heterogeneity not only matters
in the positive analysis (to predict behaviour as precise as possible), it also matters
in the normative phase of the analysis. Once the policy maker has chosen to respect
preferences, he also has to make his weighing of differences in preferences explicit. Not
unexpectedly, the degree to which he holds people responsible for their distaste for work
dramatically determines the welfare ordering.
4.2 Welfare metrics for the population
The results of the previous subsection are exacerbated if, besides preference hetero-
geneity, we also introduce differences in gross wages and non labour incomes. This is
illustrated in Figure 8 which compares the welfare orderings for the different welfare
metrics. More precisely, for each metric we calculate the relative position of each house-
hold in the welfare ordering and compare the different rankings by means of a scatter
plot. If all individuals are ranked in the same position for two metrics, the scatter is
displayed as a diagonal one. We compare all measures with the net income criterion.
Figure 8: Rank correlation of individual welfare measures
The upper left panel, with the comparison between the Rente Criterion and the pure
net income measure, shows that, not surprisingly, taking leisure into account clearly
matters. Although there is some concentration on the diagonal, the orderings of the two
measures clearly differ, but the introduction of variation in ethical priors about how to
weigh differences in preferences is obviously even more important. The mREF -criterion
with a reference wage of €7, still correlates quite well with the Rente criterion itself.
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Once we move to a wage of €20 however, and certainly to the Wage criterion mLF , the
correlation is weak, or even non existent.
The normative significance of this finding is further illustrated in table 5. There we
answer the same question "who are the poor?" and "who are the better-off?" by de-
scribing the presence of households with certain characteristics in the different quintiles
of the welfare distribution based on a given metric. We consider three characteristics
which are closely related to preference heterogeneity: living in East Germany, having
young children, and being lowly educated.
Table 5: Composition of quintiles of the welfare ordering for the different welfare metrics
Quintiles Welfare ordering based on
net Rente mREF with Reference Wage
income criterion wage ?w = criterion
mRENT €7 €12 €20 mLF
Share of East German households (20%)
1 0.31 0.22 0.33 0.47 0.61 0.62
2 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.18
3 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.07 0.14
4 0.17 0.24 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.05
5 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.11 0.08 0.04
Share of households with low education (11%)
1 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.17 0.11 0.09
2 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.20 0.14
3 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.19
4 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08
5 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06
Share of hh’s with children younger than 3 (11.5%)
1 0.22 0.29 0.23 0.12 0.03 0.00
2 0.16 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.02
3 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.19 0.04
4 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.15 0.18
5 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.33
The results are striking when reading the table across the different columns. Take the
first row, which shows the presence of East Germans in the bottom quintile of the welfare
distribution, and remember that about 20% of the sample is living in East-Germany.
When the welfare ordering is based on disposable income alone, East Germans are clearly
overrepresented in the poorest quintile. They do work more, but seemingly, their gross
wages and their non-labour incomes are lower. Moving to the second column (the Rente
criterion) is a move toward a criterion which also takes into account leisure. And yet, the
harder working East-Germans do not move down the welfare ranking because they work
more. The reason is that, under the Rente criterion, they are pushed out of the bottom
of the welfare distribution by those individuals who have a more pronounced distaste for
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working. The Rente criterion offers maximal protection with respect to this preference
characteristic, by ordering individuals with a distaste for work, ceteris paribus, lower.
Moving further to the right in the first row, across the columns of the table, shows how
sharply the share of East Germans increases in the bottom quintile, when changing the
ethical priors. When we hold individuals more responsible for their preferences w.r.t.
the labour leisure choice, and only consider differences in wage rates a legitimate reason
for redistribution, the policy analyst will find that the bottom quintile of the welfare
ordering is filled with 62% East Germans, which is three times as large as in the Rente
criterion.
The same story holds for the other characteristics. The share of households with a
lowly educated female in the bottom quintile, drops from 24% under the Rente criterion,
to 9% under the Laissez Faire criterion. And the 29% of the bottom quintile which
consists of households with children younger than three disappears completely from the
bottom of the distribution. They appear to be predominantly well off (33% of the top
quintile) when the policy analyst considers their lower preference for work not as a
legitimate reason for redistribution.
The interpretation of these striking changes in the composition of the quintiles of
the distribution in table 5 can, of course, be contaminated by correlation between the
different characteristics. In table 6 we, therefore, investigate whether the above findings
are robust when we control for this correlation. We present results from multivariate
regressions of the different welfare metrics on observed characteristics, viz. by region,
education, presence of young children and non-labour income.9
The Rente Criterion and the different metrics of the mREF -criterion are defined
in terms of monthly non-labour income. The Wage criterion mLF is expressed in its
monthly full-time equivalent. The coefficients can therefore be interpreted in monetary
terms, although a direct comparison of the wage criterion with the other ones requires
caution. Overall, the findings of table 5 seem to be robust even after controlling for
correlation between the characteristics. We find strong and significant differences in the
welfare metrics by observed demographics which can be related to preference hetero-
geneity. Ceteris paribus net income is higher for women in East German households,
lower for lowly educated females, and lower for females with young children.10 When
the policy analyst moves to the Rente criterion, these effects are strongly amplified.
East German women are judged to be even more better off than when using net income,
and lowly educated females and females with young children are considered more worse
9Note that for comparability we always use expected rather than observed household income. Ex-
pected net income is calculated as net income in the optimal working alternative of the wife averaged
over the 100 draws from the extreme value distribution.
10The positive effect of the East German dummy on net income follows from the fact that we control for
non-labor income (i.e. mainly the income of the husband), which is higher for West German households.
A regression without this non-labor income as explanatory variable gives the expected negative sign for
the East German dummy on net income.
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Table 6: Regression of the different welfare metrics on demographic characteristics
Welfare ordering based on
net Rente mREF with Reference Wage
income criterion wage ?w = criterion
mRENT €7 €12 €20 mLF
East Germany 109 339 73 -135 -421 -203
(22) (32) (28) (28) (27) (11)
Low Education -173 -366 -224 -182 -108 1.5
(27) (39) (35) (35) (33) (13.9)
Child younger 3 -199 -650 -372 -172 142 452
(29) (42) (37) (37) (35) (15)
Child between 3 and 6 -244 -594 -387 -251 -31 182
(26) (37) (33) (33) (32) (13)
Age wife 3.3 -2.6 2.6 6.4 11.5 8.9
(2.3) (3.3) (3.0) (3.0) (2.8) (1.2)
Age husband 5.7 13.0 8.2 5.7 1.9 -0.4
(2.2) (3.2) (2.9) (2.8) (2.7) (1.1)
Non labour income in (1000) 451 508 614 657 722 255
(8) (11) (10) (10) (10) (4)
Constant 194 1200 463 185 -396 -57
(60) (87) (78) (77) (74) (31)
Note: Coefficients are obtained by multivariate regressions of the welfare metric in
monetary terms on demographic characteristics. All welfare measures are expressed in
Euros/1000 per months. Welfare effects are derived based on the estimated coefficients
and draws from the extreme value distributed error terms.
off. The amplification of the welfare differences is erased again when switching to the
reference wage criterion with a wage of €7. But, and this is even more striking, even
when we control for other observable characteristics, we do find rank reversal. East
Germans e.g. are, ceteris paribus, considered worse off when using reference wages of
€12 or €20, and also when using the wage criterion. This rightmost column of table 6
suggests that, when measured by the wage criterion welfare is about 200 Euros lower
for East Germans, ceteris paribus, whereas they were considered to be 339 euros better
off by means of the Rente criterion. The opposite holds for females in households with
young children, and the welfare difference between the different measures is even larger.
Ceteris paribus a household with young children is considered to be 650 euros worse
off with the Rente criterion, but are 450 euros better off with the wage criterion. We
find these rank reversals for all characteristics. They are outspoken for the presence of
children, but individuals with less education are no longer considered worse off neither,
once the policy maker does no longer accept that preference characteristics, leading to
a lower willingness to work, are a legitimate reason for redistribution.
Tables 5 and 6 not only illustrate the importance of taking leisure into account in the
individual welfare measure. They also point to the importance of clearly specifying and
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founding the normative choices underlying redistributive activities in a setting where
one respects preference heterogeneity.
4.3 Gainers and losers of a stylised reform in work incentives
The previous section demonstrated how sensitive the welfare distribution is to norma-
tive principles in a setting which respects preference heterogeneity. However, in practice,
policy makers might be more interested in identifying gainers and losers of policy re-
forms, instead of knowing who are the poor and the rich in levels. It is possible that the
change in welfare level is less sensitive to the underlying normative choices. To inves-
tigate this, we simulated a stylised policy reform similar to a subsidy of social security
contributions. In particular we increased gross female wages by 1%. We used the labour
supply model to determine the behavioural reaction and calculate the welfare metrics
before and after the reform. The relative change in the individual welfare metric was
used to rank the population in increasing order of welfare gain. This gain distribution
was partitioned into quintiles and table 7 describes the composition of these quintiles in
terms of characteristics that were relevant for the preference heterogeneity.
The bottom quintile in table 7 contains the households who have the smallest gain.
The top quintile is populated by the households with the largest gains. According to
the pure income measure which neglects leisure, East Germans are overrepresented in
the highest quintile of gainers (33% of this quintile consists of East Germans). The
quintile of (relative) losers of the reform are dominated by lowly educated people, and
even more outspoken, by households with young children. These standard results are
of course directly related to the labour market participation of these respective groups.
The question is whether the identification of gainers and losers is robust with respect to
choice of the individual welfare metric.
We therefore move to the right in table 7 to use metrics which take up leisure (and
the change therein) in the welfare metric, and fully account for preference heterogeneity
between the individuals. The overrepresentation of East Germans among the gainers
of the reform further increases to 50% when using the Rente criterion to assess the
impact of a gross wage increase, but it drops back to 35% when using the wage criterion
mLF . This illustrates the crucial role of the slope of the indifference curves (and hence
the preference heterogeneity), not only in the calculation of the welfare level, but also
for the welfare difference. A given net income change translates in a larger welfare
gain (e.g. measured on the vertical axis at l = 0), the flatter the indifference curve is.
With the Rente criterion e.g. one not only considers people with distaste for work as
worse off in levels, one also considers that an increase in labour income is valued less
by them. However, when the policy maker discards the low preference for work as a
legitimate reason for favourable treatment, the share of East Germans in the top quintile
falls back to a much lover percentage (35%). They still gain considerably because they
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Table 7: Composition of quintiles of gainers and losers of a change in work incentives
Quintiles Welfare ordering based on
net Rente mREF with Reference Wage
income criterion wage ?w = criterion
mRENT €7 €12 €20 mLF
Share of East German households (20%)
1 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06
2 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.13
3 0.21 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.20
4 0.31 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.28
5 0.33 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.35
Share of households with low education (11%)
1 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.17
2 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.15
3 0.10 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13
4 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.08
5 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
Share of hh’s with children younger than 3 (11.5%)
1 0.40 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.37 0.26
2 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.19
3 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07
4 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03
5 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
Note: We consider a tax reform consisting of 1% increase in gross
wages. Expected Welfare effects are derived from simulated
labour supply behaviour under 100 draws from the extreme
value distributed error terms.
Source: SOEP, wave 2005.
work a lot and hence capture the wage increase, but compared to the Rente criterion, a
hard working person is no longer treated unfavourably, ceteris paribus, as compared to
someone who works less.
The choice of metric also has an outspoken effect on where we classify the families
with young children: the share in the lowest quintile varies between 45% and 26% when
switching from the Rente to the Wage criterion. For education the effect is especially
striking in the top quintile of gainers. Lowly educated households form 4% of the top
quintile of the gainers distribution when using the income criterion, but they are all
re-allocated to a relatively more losing position when taking leisure into account, and
not holding them responsible for their preference characteristics (the Rente criterion).
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5 Conclusion
Besides differences in budget sets, heterogeneity in preferences plays a crucial part in
explanatory models of labour supply. But the incompatibility between the respect for
heterogeneous preferences (as e.g. expressed in Paretianity of the social ordering) and
interpersonal comparability, has confined applied welfare analysis to the case of com-
parability by means of a reference household or individual. Sensitivity analysis of the
robustness of empirical results with respect to the choice of the reference household
suggests that the choice of this reference preference is not very important (Aaberge et
al. 2004).
Introducing a reference preference ordering is however, only one way to escape the
impossibility result. In this paper we have followed a different route in the normative
part of the analysis by calculating welfare metrics which fully respect preference het-
erogeneity but restrict the scope of interpersonal comparisons. We applied some of the
measures developed in Fleurbaey (2006) and highlighted their different underlying nor-
mative priors in the empirical context of an estimated labour supply model. These by
now standard discrete choice models of labour supply reveal considerable preference het-
erogeneity and hence are excellent candidates to illustrate the normative issues at hand.
In this paper we explored how this positive information could be fed into the newly
proposed metrics, and shed light on the empirical relevance of the choice to respect
preference heterogeneity.
The results of the comparison of welfare orderings based on different metrics are
striking. Not the inclusion of leisure into the welfare metric plays the decisive role, but
the different normative treatment of the preference heterogeneity with respect to the
labour-leisure choice. This indicates that the above mentioned robustness of results with
respect to the choice of the reference household might have to do more with the removal
of preference heterogeneity than with a robustness as such. The illustrative results have
severe consequences for any policy advice which wants to incorporate distributional
analyses against the background of preference heterogeneity (and respecting it). The
answer to the question "who is worst off" and "who is best off" inevitably has to face
the question whether one treats people with different preferences differently. Does one
consider preference characteristics as legitimate sources for compensation or not? If the
answer is affirmative, one might go for a normative analysis based on, what is called in
this paper, the Rente criterion. In that case, the difference between welfare ordering
based on disposable income and a metric which includes leisure is not very important. If,
however, one only considers differences in the budget constraints, as legitimate reasons
for redistribution, one has to choose for the wage criterion. The correlation between the
ordering based on disposable income and this wage criterion is very weak.
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6 Appendix: Recipes used to calculate the money metrics
6.1 The Box-Cox utility function and the budget constraint
The deterministic part of the utility function, with net income c and labour l as endo-
geneous variables reads as (see (7)):
u(c, l) = βc
∙
cαc − 1
αc
¸
+ βL
∙
(1− l)αL − 1
αL
¸
, (9)
where we have omitted the subscripts i and j used in the text to refer to the household
and the chosen discrete point. The available time endowment is normalised at 1 and
leisure equals L = 1− l.
To graph the indifference curves, we solve c for a given u and varying labour supply
l in (9) :
c = f(u, l) =
∙
αc
βc
∙
u− βL
(1− l)αL − 1
αL
¸
+ 1
¸ 1
αc
(10)
The budget constraint follows from the tax benefit system, determining net income
c from gross income wl, non labour income I and other characteristics:
c = n(I,wl; zi). (11)
This non linear budget constraint (11) can be linearised by determining virtual non
labour income μ for a virtual net wage ω (e.g. corresponding to the MRSc,l in the
observed choice (c, l)-see below):
μ = c− ω.l. (12)
6.2 First Partial derivatives
∂u
∂c
= uc = βc.c
αc−1 (13)
∂u
∂L
= uL = βL.L
αL−1 (14)
∂u
∂l
= ul = −uL = −βL(1− l)αL−1 (15)
Hence marginal utility is positive for resp. consumption and leisure if βc > 0 and βL > 0.
The latter guarantees that labour has disutility.
6.3 Second derivatives
∂
∂c
uc = ucc = βc(αc − 1).cαc−2 (16)
∂
∂l
ul = ull = −
∂
∂L
ul = −
∂
∂L
(−uL) = uLL = βL(αL − 1).cαL−2 (17)
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We have decreasing marginal utilities (ucc < 0 and uLL < 0) for both consumption and
leisure if resp. αc < 1 and αL < 1. Cross-effects are zero. Note that the change in the
marginal disutility of labour is also negative. Hence, the marginal utility of labour is
negative, and becomes more negative the more we work.
6.4 The Marginal Rate of Substitution
6.4.1 Between c and leisure L
0 = du = uc dc+ uL dL
⇔ dc
dL
=MRSc,L = −
uL
uc
= −βL.L
αL−1
βc.cαc−1
(18)
Since we have βc > 0 and βL > 0 if the marginal utilities are positive, the slope of the
c− L−indifference curves will be negative.
To make the slope become less negative as L increases, the absolute value of the
MRSc,L should decrease:
∂
∂L
|MRSc,L| = ∂∂L
h
βLL
αL−1β−1c c
−(αc−1)
i
,
where c is itself a function of L to stay on the indifference curve. Hence:
∂
∂L
|MRSc,L| = βLβc
∙
(αL − 1)LαL−2
cαc−1
− LαL−1(αc − 1)c−αc
dc
dL
¸
=
βL
βc
∙
(αL − 1)LαL−2
cαc−1
− (αc − 1)L
αL−1
cαc
|MRSc,L|
¸
,
which can be signed as negative when αc < 1 and αL < 1.
6.4.2 Between c and labour supply l
dc
dl
=MRSc,l = −
ul
uc
=
uL
uc
=
βL
βc
(1− l)αL−1
cαc−1
(19)
which is positive and increasing (the compensation needed to work more and more is
increasing).
6.4.3 Virtual non labour income
Using the MRSc,l in the observed choice (c0, l0) we can determine virtual non labour
income for a linearised budget constraint with net wage equal to the MRSc,l in the
observed point. SubstituteMRSc,l for w in (12) and solve for virtual non labour income
μ:
μ0 = c0 −MRSc0,l0 .l0. (20)
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6.5 Calculation of the welfare measures
6.5.1 The Rente-criterion mRENT
For reference wage ew = 0, labour income = 0. We calculate virtual non labour income
such that u0 = u(c0, l0), given by (9), is reached in a c, l-combination whereMRSc,l = 0.
We assume that the indifference curve has a positive slope at l = 0. Excluding negative
labour supply, we end up with a corner solution at the intersection of the IC with the
vertical net income axis. Hence, we calculate from (10):
mRENT (c0, l0) = f(u(c0, l0), 0)
=
∙
αc
βc
∙
u0 − βL
1αL − 1
αL
¸
+ 1
¸ 1
αc
=
∙
αc
βc
u0 + 1
¸ 1
αc
.
6.5.2 The Rente+minimum wage criterion mREF
For this measure we choose a reference wage ew, and look for the c, l-combination where
the MRSc,l equals this reference wage. Hence from (19) we have:
ew = βL
βc
(1− l)αL−1
cαc−1
,
which can be solved for c as:
c(l; ew) = ∙ 1ew βLβc (1− l)αL−1
¸ 1
αc−1
, (21)
giving all c, l-combinations satisfying MRSc,l = ew. The one combination on the initial
indifference curve u0 = u(c0, l0) is found by substituting (21) in the utility function (9):
u0 = u(c0, l0) =
µ
βc
αc
¶(∙
1ew βLβc (1− l)αL−1
¸ αc
αc−1
− 1
)
+ βL
∙
(1− l)αL − 1
αL
¸
. (22)
For a given value of u0, we solve (22) for l numerically by starting at l = 0 and assuming
that in this point theMRSc,l will be lower than the required reference wage ew. We then
gradually increase l, calculate the corresponding c, the MRSc,l, and compare with ew.
To sum up:
1. choose l(0) where the superscript between bracket denotes the iteration;
2. determine c(0) to be on the IC with level u0 with this l(0) by using (10);
3. calculate the MRSc(0),l(0) in this point (c
(0), l(0)) by using (19);
4. compare with MRSc(0),l(0) with ew
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• if MRSc(0),l(0) < ew, increase labour supply with a small step and go back to
step 1;
• if MRSc(0),l(0) ≥ ew, leave the iterative loop;
Denote the values of net income and labour supply when the loop is left as (c(r), l(r)).
Measure mREF is determined by calculating the virtual non labour income from (20)
mREF (c0, l0) = c(r) − ew.l(r).
We also calculate the utility level u(c(r), l(r)) to check its equality to u0.
6.5.3 The wage criterion mLF
For the measure mLF we search for the c, l-combination on the indifference curve u0 =
u(c0, l0), where the MRSc,l equals the ratio cl (denoted by c
LF , lLF ). From (19) we
have:
c
l
=
βL
βc
(1− l)αL−1
cαc−1
(23)
Following the same sequence as for mREF , we first solve for c as a function of l and then
substitute this c into the utility function:
c.cαc−1 =
βL
βc
(1− l).lαL−1, (24)
but again this is not analytically solvable. As for mREF , we therefore start form a
(c(0), l(0))-guess, calculate theMRSc(0),l(0) , compare it with the ratio
c(0)
l(0) and then adjust
the guess. We infer where to move from the intial choice based on the sign of the virtual
non labour income μ0 calculated in (20). If this virtual non labour income is positive
we know that
MRSc0,l0 <
c0
l0
,
and hence the (c, l)-combination where both are equal must be at the right of the chosen
point lLF > l0. If the virtual non labour income is negative we have the reverse situation:
MRSc0,l0 >
c0
l0
⇒ lLF < l0.
We therefore start the search iteration from the initial point (c0, l0) (all the more because
starting at l = 0 is numerically infeasible since the ratio c/l is undefined, and starting
at l = 1 might also lead to an overflow for MRSc,l). The iterations then run as follows:
1. Start with l(0) = l0 and c(0) = c0;
2. Calculate the ratio r(0) = c
(0)
l(0) and calculate MRSc(0),l(0) from (19);
3. Compare r(0) with MRSc(0),l(0) , with d = MRSc(0),l(0) − r(0). This difference is
negative for μ0 > 0 and positive for μ0 < 0.
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4. Fix a variable l_step = sign(μ0) ∗ [small increment in labour supply].
5. Check the condition sign(μ0) ∗ d < 0
• if true, go to step 6
• if false, leave the iteration.
6. change l(0) with l_step;
7. change c(0) accordingly to stay on the same IC as u0 using (10);
8. go back to step 2
When the iteration is quit, we have measure mLF = c
LF
lLF .
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